U.S. manufacturing experienced a precipitous and historically unprecedented decline in employment in the 2000s. Many economists and other analysts-pointing to decades of statistics showing that manufacturing real (inflation-adjusted) output growth has largely kept pace with private sector real output growth, that productivity growth has been much higher, and that the sector's share of aggregate employment has been declining-argue that manufacturing's job losses are largely the result of productivity growth (assumed to reflect automation) and are part of a long-term trend. Since the 1980s, however, the apparently robust growth in manufacturing real output and productivity have been driven by a relatively small industry-computer and electronic products, whose extraordinary performance reflects the way statistical agencies account for rapid product improvements in the industry. Without the computer industry, there is no prima facie evidence that productivity caused manufacturing's relative and absolute employment decline. This paper discusses interpreting labor productivity statistics, which capture many factors besides automation, and cautions against using descriptive evidence to draw causal inferences. It also reviews the research literature to date, which finds that trade significantly contributed to the collapse of manufacturing employment in the 2000s, but finds little evidence of a causal link to automation.
Countering this view, many economists, policymakers, and pundits cite manufacturing output and productivity statistics to assert that American manufacturing has never been stronger.
They point out that although manufacturing employment had been relatively stable before 2000, its share of U.S. employment had been in decline for decades. Often making analogies to the agricultural sector, they contend that automation, not globalization, largely explains manufacturing's relative employment declines and steep job losses in recent years. Regardless of whether the view represents a consensus, it reflects a misreading of the data and research evidence. The apparently robust growth in manufacturing inflation-adjusted (real) output and productivity are driven by a relatively small sector-computers and electronic products, which account for only about 13 percent of value-added in manufacturing. Without the computer and electronic products industry (hereafter referred to simply as "the computer industry"), real value-added or GDP growth in manufacturing was less than half that of the private sector average from 1979 to 2000, and only 12 percent in the 2000s. And without the computer industry, manufacturing labor productivity generally has been no higher or only somewhat higher than that of the private sector.
The computer industry, in turn, is an outlier and statistical anomaly. Its extraordinary output and productivity growth reflect the way statistical agencies account for improvements in selected products produced in this industry, particularly computers and semiconductors. Rapid productivity growth in this industry-and by extension the above-average productivity growth in the manufacturing sector-has little to do with automation of the production process. Nor is extraordinary real output and productivity growth an indicator of the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing in the computer industry; rather, the locus of production of the industry's core products has shifted to Asia.
Manufacturing's declining employment share has mirrored its declining share of output (nominal GDP) and to a large degree reflects the fact that, in most manufacturing industries, there has been relatively little growth in the amount of goods made in American factories for the past 40 years. The recent precipitous decline in manufacturing employment is a distinct phenomenon, and a growing body of research examines whether-and the extent to whichinternational trade can explain it. Although none of the studies comprehensively examine the 3 various mechanisms by which trade and the broader forces of globalization may impact employment, collectively they find that trade has played a significant role in the collapse of U.S. manufacturing employment in the 2000s. In contrast, research to date finds little support for the hypothesis that automation was responsible for the sudden decline.
In the remainder of the paper, I elaborate on these points. I close with a brief discussion of the consequences of the large job losses in manufacturing for workers and regional economies and consider lessons for policy. 2 Changes in industry classification systems, particularly the shift from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the North American Classification System (NAICS) implemented in the late 1990s or early 2000s (depending on the data series), have made historical analysis of trends in manufacturing and other sectors difficult. The Bureau of Economic Analysis recently constructed a consistent time series for industries or sectors from 1947 to the present for data on employment (breakdowns for manufacturing industries since 1977), nominal and real GDP, and GDP price deflators. Most of the analyses in this paper make use of this consistent time series. The number of manufacturing establishments plotted in Figure 1 comes from the Census Bureau's Business Dynamics Statistics.
THE COLLAPSE OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN THE 2000s
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Employment in manufacturing was relatively stable in the 1990s. Although measured employment declined by about 700,000, or 4 percent, from 1989 to 2000, the net decline in jobs can be entirely explained by the outsourcing of tasks previously done in-house. For example, the number of temporary help workers assigned to manufacturers increased by an estimated one million over the period. Although these workers are the legal employees of temporary help agencies and so are counted in the services sector, they work in the factories side-by-side with manufacturing employees. Had these workers been counted in manufacturing, manufacturing employment would have risen by an estimated 1.3 percent rather than declining (Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 2012) .
Evidence suggests that other types of domestic outsourcing, although not well measured, partly explain the decline in manufacturing employment since World War II. Berlingieri (2014) estimates that domestic outsourcing accounted for 25 percent of manufacturing's employment decline from 1948 to 2002. Although manufacturers have continued to outsource in the 2000s, this factor likely has played a relatively small role in the recent declines in manufacturing employment (Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 2012, 2017) . Not only was the sharp decline in manufacturing employment historically unprecedented in the United States, the magnitude of the decline was unique among the world's leading manufacturing economies, according to an analysis by the U.S. International Trade Commission (Benedetto 2018) . Over the 1998 to 2014 period, manufacturing employment significantly expanded in China and in South Korea. Although manufacturing employment shrank by almost 9 percent in Germany during this period, the drop was far less than in the United States and, Benedetto notes, was accompanied by a 4.8 percent decrease in the German working age population. Among the five leading manufacturing economies, only Japan experienced a similar percentage decline in manufacturing employment as the United States, but its working age population declined by over 9 percent over the period-in contrast to the United States, where the working age population grew by more than 16 percent.
THE PUZZLE
Reflecting stable or declining employment in the manufacturing sector, the share of U.S. manufacturing's contribution to private sector GDP peaked at 33 percent in 1953, and by 2016 6 its share was just 13 percent. The trends in these shares are depicted in the right scale of Figure   2 . Together, they suggest that performance in the manufacturing sector has been weak relative to the rest of the economy.
Figure 2 also depicts indices of real GDP for the private sector and for manufacturing (left scale). Although manufacturing output is more cyclically sensitive than the average for the private sector, real GDP growth in manufacturing has largely kept pace with that of the private sector overall. This fact is somewhat paradoxical in view of manufacturing's declining employment and GDP shares. Only since the Great Recession has real GDP growth been considerably slower in manufacturing than in the aggregate economy.
If real GDP growth for manufacturing has kept pace with real GDP growth in the aggregate economy yet manufacturing's share of private sector GDP is falling, then it must be the case that the average price growth of manufactured goods has been slower than the average price growth for the goods and services produced in the economy. Figure 3 , which displays an index of GDP price deflators for manufacturing and for the private sector, confirms this pattern.
The slower growth in price deflators for manufacturing is evident since about 1980. In addition, if real GDP growth has kept pace with real GDP growth in the aggregate private sector yet manufacturing's share of private sector employment is falling, it follows that labor productivity growth is higher in manufacturing than the average for the private sector.
RECONCILING MANUFACTURING'S DECLINING SHARES WITH ROBUST OUTPUT GROWTH: THE PREVAILING NARRATIVE
Manufacturing's declining share of private sector employment results because manufacturing employment is growing more slowly than the aggregate private sector 7 employment. Using the fact that labor productivity is defined as output per unit labor, these differential growth rates can be expressed by the following identity:
In an accounting sense, the difference in the growth rates of labor employed in the aggregate private sector and in manufacturing (LT and LM) is equal to the difference in the growth rates of real GDP less the difference in the growth rates of labor productivity. If manufacturing's real GDP growth rate is approximately the same as the average for the private sector, as indicated in Figure 2 , then all, or virtually all, of manufacturing's declining employment share is accounted for by higher labor productivity growth.
Although research economists widely recognize that such accounting identities and other descriptive evidence cannot be used to infer causality, many have taken it as strong prima facie evidence that higher productivity growth in manufacturing-implicitly or explicitly assumed to reflect automation-has largely caused the relative and absolute declines of manufacturing employment. Even when some role for trade is recognized, it is deemed small, and the decline is taken as inevitable (e.g., DeLong 2017).
Yet productivity growth, which is necessary for improvements in living standards, does not by itself cause employment declines. Productivity growth should lead to higher inflationadjusted wages, and higher productivity growth in manufacturing should lead to declining prices for manufactured goods relative to other goods and services. This, in turn, stimulates demand for manufactured products. To meet higher demand for their products, manufacturers produce more-potentially fully (or more than fully) offsetting the adverse effects of higher labor productivity on employment. To reconcile higher manufacturing productivity growth with declining relative and absolute employment, therefore, it must also be the case that consumer 8 demand for manufactured goods is limited and so not very responsive to the declining prices.
Analogies are often made to agriculture, where people's food consumption is limited and where mechanization has displaced most farm workers.
AN ALTERNATE RECONCILIATION: MEASUREMENT ISSUES
The arguably anomalous patterns depicted in Figure 2 -sharply declining manufacturing share of GDP coupled with robust growth in real GDP in manufacturing-imply that price inflation is much lower in manufacturing than in the aggregate economy. One might suppose that there is something unusual about price deflators in manufacturing. Indeed, the apparently strong growth in real manufacturing output is driven by the computer and electronic products industry and reflects the fact that price deflators for certain key products in the industry, namely computers and semiconductors, are adjusted to reflect rapidly improving product quality. For much of the recent past, these price deflators have been sharply declining. Although the computer industry has accounted for less than 15 percent of value-added in manufacturing throughout the period, it has an outsized effect on measured real output and productivity growth in the sector, skewing these statistics and giving a misleading impression of the health of American manufacturing. GDP growth in manufacturing was 97 percent of the average for the private sector; when the computer industry is dropped from both series, manufacturing's real GDP growth rate is just 45 percent that of the private sector average.
Output growth substantially slowed in both manufacturing and the private sector in the 2000s. In the published series displayed in Figure 2 , real output growth in manufacturing was somewhat higher in manufacturing than in the private sector between the business cycle peaks of and services to change smoothly over time. Although they avoid biases associated with the old fixed-weight indices, they are computationally more difficult to work with. To back out the computer industry from aggregate price indices and real GDP measures using published data, I employ a Törnqvist index, as described in Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon (2015, p. 157 ).
manufacturing's measured real output growth is near zero (about 0.2 percent per year) and just 12 percent of the average for the private sector in the 2000s. 
WHAT EXPLAINS THE EXTRAORDINARY OUTPUT GROWTH IN THE COMPUTER AND SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY?
As indicated earlier, the answer to the question of what explains the large and sustained growth in computers and semiconductors lies in the way that the statistical agencies, through the construction of price indices, account for the rapid technological advances in the products produced in this industry. The semiconductors embedded in our electronics are much more powerful today than they were a decade or even a year ago. Likewise, the computers and related devices that consumers and businesses buy today have much greater functionality than in the past. If, for example, buyers are willing to pay 15 percent more for a new computer model that boasts greater speed and more memory than last year's model, then 100 of the new computers would be the equivalent of 115 of the previous year's model. The rapid output growth in this industry does not necessarily imply that American factories are producing many more computers, semiconductors, and related products-they may be producing less. Instead, it reflects the fact that the quality of the products produced is better than in the past. The statistical agencies adjust price deflators for other products, such as autos, for changes in quality. However, the effects of quality adjustment in other industries on aggregate statistics, to date, have generally been small compared to those of the computer industry.
It follows that the rapid productivity growth accompanying output growth in the computer industry has little if anything to do with automation: production of computers and semiconductors has been automated for many years. Rather, rapid productivity growth in the industry-and, by extension, the above-average productivity growth in manufacturing-largely reflects improvements in high-tech products.
Nor is the rapid growth in measured computer and semiconductor output a good indicator of the international competitiveness of domestic manufacturing of these products. As detailed in Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon (2015) , the locus of production of these products has been shifting to Asia, and the large employment losses in this industry reflect offshoring and foreign competition.
It should be emphasized that the statistical agencies are correct to adjust prices for improvements in product quality. The adjustments, however, can be highly sensitive to methodology and idiosyncratic factors. A change in Intel's pricing strategy for older-generation semiconductors is partly responsible for the slowdown, as explained in Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2015) . The slowdown in the rate at which price deflators are falling has sparked a debate over whether the size of the quality adjustments for the computer and semiconductor industry has been too great or too little. Because these adjustments potentially have large effects at both 13 industry and aggregate levels on measured real output and productivity growth, it is an important area for future research.
Such quality adjustment, however, can make the numbers difficult to interpret. Because the computer industry, though small in dollar terms, skews the aggregate manufacturing statistics and has led to much confusion, figures that exclude this industry, as shown in Figure 5 , provide a clearer picture of trends in manufacturing output.
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND INTERPRETING DECOMPOSITIONS THAT SHOW PRODUCTIVITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
The computer industry also has a large influence on measured productivity in the manufacturing sector. For various time horizons from 1987 to 2011, Baily and Bosworth (2014) estimate labor and multifactor productivity growth for the private sector, for aggregate manufacturing and for manufacturing excluding the computer industry. They find that while labor and multifactor productivity growth are considerably higher in manufacturing, when the computer industry is dropped from the calculations, these productivity measures are virtually identical to average productivity growth for the private sector over all time periods examined. As noted from Equation (1), if real GDP growth equals the average growth for the private sector, then productivity growth accounts for all of the relative decline in manufacturing employment.
Conversely, if, excluding the computer industry, real GDP growth is lower in manufacturing than in the private sector and labor productivity growth is the same, labor productivity growth can account for none of the relative decline in employment in most of manufacturing.
Since 1977, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has published an industry employment series that is consistent with its industry real and nominal output series. Although employment is a crude measure of labor input because it does not control for differences in hours worked, it allows me to construct the decompositions using Equation (1) for a relatively long-time horizon and show the sensitivity of these decompositions to inclusion of the computer industry. The top panel of Table 1 Moreover, labor productivity growth is not synonymous with automation, and measured productivity growth may be simply picking up the effects of international trade and other forces associated with globalization. Given its importance, I elaborate on this last point in the following section.
What Labor Productivity Measures Capture
Labor productivity in an industry or sector is typically defined as value-added (the returns to capital and labor) divided by a measure of labor input (hours worked or employment). Labor 8 The methodology used to construct price indices does not capture price drops when a purchaser shifts to a less expensive supplier of a good or service. Therefore, lower prices that have driven the growth in imported products from low-wage countries are not captured in import price indices. Houseman et al. (2011) discuss import price bias and estimate the bias in manufacturing statistics from the growth in imported material intermediates. Mandel and Carew (2012) estimate the bias to all GDP from the growth in imports. productivity will increase if processes are automated-i.e., if businesses invest in capital equipment and that equipment substitutes for workers in the production process. Measured growth in labor productivity, however, captures many factors besides automation. As already discussed, the strong productivity growth in the manufacturing sector has been driven by productivity growth in the computer industry, which largely stems from product improvements owing to research and development, not from automation of the production process. Although the computer industry has had by far the largest influence on real output and productivity growth in aggregate manufacturing, output and productivity measures in other industries, such as motor vehicles, are significantly affected by quality adjustment of price deflators.
In addition, as noted, manufacturers have outsourced many activities previously done inhouse, either to domestic or foreign suppliers. If the outsourced activities are primarily done by relatively low-paid, low-value-added workers, or if the outsourced labor is cheaper than the inhouse labor, measured labor productivity will mechanically increase. International competition may directly impact measured manufacturing productivity by affecting the composition of products produced and processes used in the United States. The industries and plants within industries most affected by increased competition from low-wage countries will likely be the most labor-intensive. Similarly, the growth of global supply chains and the slicing up of the value chain may impact the stages of production done in the United States, affecting labor productivity measures. Exposure to trade can accelerate the adoption of automated processes (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 2016; Pierce and Schott 2016) . In these cases, there is no simple parsing out of the effects of trade and automation on employment.
A study of plant closures in the early 2000s with a focus on the home furniture industry illustrates these forces (Holmes 2011) . The making of high-quality wood furniture such as bedroom and dining room furniture, known as casegoods, requires human craftsmanship, is labor intensive, and does not lend itself to automation. The surge of imports from China and other Asian countries beginning in the late 1990s hit the casegoods industry particularly hard; between 1997 and 2007, a majority of the large casegoods plants shut down, most of the rest downsized, and employment in the industry dropped by half. The upholstery industry was also hard-hit by imports but fared better because of the custom nature of the product and the expense associated with shipping bulky sofas. The U.S. upholstery industry, however, offshored the labor-intensive "cut-and-sew" of upholstery fabric to China in kits, which could be inexpensively shipped. These kits were then stuffed with U.S.-built frames and foam. Holmes investigated two very large plants classified in casegoods that survived the surge of Asian imports. One made ready-toassemble furniture, thus effectively "outsourcing" the labor-intensive assembly process to the customer, 9 and had mechanized the stage where finish is applied to the furniture. The other, he discovered, actually imported all of its casegoods from China. The facility, which served as the corporate headquarters, engaged in some manufacturing of upholstered furniture, but it imported the wood furniture from China and offshored the labor-intensive cut-and-sew work to China.
The furniture case study illustrates how trade may affect the composition of products produced and the stages of production done in U.S. manufacturing and shift production toward more mechanized plants. These forces will all raise measured labor productivity.
A widely cited Ball State University report illustrates the problem with using accounting identities to draw conclusions about automation's contribution to manufacturing's job losses (Hicks and Devaraj 2017). The report's authors apply a variant of Equation (1) to manufacturing industries, concluding that productivity growth accounts for most of the job losses. For example, Hicks and Devaraj claim that from 2000 to 2010 a staggering 3.9 million jobs in the computer and electronics products industry were "not filled due to productivity," more than five times the number of jobs lost (Table 3) . Such a claim is absurd. As noted, the productivity gains in the computer industry largely reflect dramatic improvements in the speed and functionality of computers and related products, not automation of the production process. In short, productivity growth does not, per se, cause employment declines. Accounting identities and other descriptive evidence cannot be used to draw inferences about the causes of these declines, but once the anomalous effects of computer industry are excluded, even descriptive statistics provide no prima facie evidence that higher rates of automation were primarily responsible for the long-term decline in manufacturing's share of employment. Rather, they suggest that understanding the reasons for the slow output growth in manufacturing output-whether from weak growth in domestic demand, strong growth in imports, or weak growth in exports-is critical.
10
RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES OF MANUFACTURING'S EMPLOYMENT DECLINE IN THE 2000s
Accounting identities such as those in Equation (1) imports, but much may be exported to other countries; thus, the effects on U.S. output growth through this channel, though potentially important for manufacturing employment, will not show up directly in U.S. trade statistics. 13 Additionally, manufacturing job losses owing to trade will have spillover effects in the economy, potentially depressing domestic demand for manufactured goods. And international competition may reduce investment in the United States, undermining the sector's competitiveness and depressing demand for manufacturing workers in the future.
11 Fort, Pierce, and Schott (2018) also note that research cannot provide such decompositions. 12 I do not review earlier research that focused on the effects of international trade on the declines in manufacturing employment during the 1980s. To my knowledge, no rigorous studies have examined the causes of manufacturing's declining share of aggregate employment during periods when the sector's employment levels were rising or relatively stable.
13 Setser (2017) , for example, discusses the slow growth of U.S. exports outside of NAFTA.
No study captures all aspects of globalization and its effects on manufacturing employment, and the limitations of any single study need to be recognized. Collectively, however, a growing body of research points to sizable adverse effects, operating through various mechanisms.
The precipitous decline in manufacturing employment in the early 2000s coincided with a dramatic widening of the merchandise trade deficit, led by a rise in imports from China. This suggested that trade, and Chinese imports in particular, were behind the collapse. Several studies focus on the effects of Chinese imports on U.S. manufacturing employment. Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson (2013) firms to incur sunk costs of shifting operations to China or of partnering with a Chinese manufacturer, 2) it provided Chinese producers with incentives to enter or further invest in exporting to the U.S. market, and 3) it provided an incentive for U.S. firms to invest in labor-saving technology or to shift the mix of products they produced to less labor-intensive ones.
Pierce and Schott find that manufacturing industries in the United States that were more affected by the change in trade policy experienced larger employment losses and that all three channels contributed to the losses. In addition, using input-output linkages, they find that U.S. suppliers to the industries impacted by the change in trade policy also experienced employment losses and were more likely to close, which could reflect reduced demand or a decision by these firms to also offshore production to China.
In addition, studies have found sizable adverse effects of Chinese imports on U.S. firm sales, investment, patents, and research and development (Autor et al. 2017; Pierce and Schott 2017) . These adverse effects raise larger concerns about the loss of competitiveness of domestic manufacturers, with implications for future employment in the sector.
Studies have also examined the effects on manufacturing employment from activities by multinational companies, which have accounted for a disproportionate share of the employment decline. Using firm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Harrison and McMillan (2011) find that offshoring to low-wage countries substitutes for domestic employment, but that some offshoring is complementary and increases a company's domestic employment. On net, they find a small negative impact of offshoring on parent employment. Using establishment-level data on multinational firms from the Census Bureau, Boehm, Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2015) estimate that the offshoring of intermediate inputs, which they find is primarily done by Campbell's study potentially captures effects of an exchange-rate appreciation on manufacturing employment that operates through higher imports (not just imports from China) and lower
exports. An important innovation of Campbell's work is to adjust the real exchange rate index for compositional changes in trading partners toward developing countries with lower price levels, such as China. This adjustment shows that the real appreciation of the dollar was substantially greater than an index that does not take into account these compositional changes.
Campbell estimates that the exchange rate appreciation can explain 1.5 million of the job losses in manufacturing from 1995 to 2008. He also presents for this and other exchange rate shocks evidence of hysteresis: job losses from a temporary exchange rate appreciation are not reversed when a currency subsequently depreciates. Economic theory suggests that hysteresis may be important when there are sunk costs and learning by doing. An appreciation of the dollar could stimulate sunk-cost investments in production and supply chains in developing countries with lower production costs. Campbell points out that even if the currency returns to its original value vis-à-vis its trading partners, production costs may still be lower in the developing countries where firms invested, and the currency depreciation would not induce firms to write off these sunk-cost investments. Additionally, firms operating in foreign countries may become more efficient over time (learning by doing) and thus develop a comparative advantage. The appreciation of the dollar, therefore, may induce investments in low-cost countries that still enjoy a cost advantage even after the dollar depreciates to its prior level.
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The Causal Effect of Automation
While studies have generally found that factors related to trade have played an important role in the decline of manufacturing employment in the 2000s, studies have failed to uncover a strong relationship between automation and manufacturing job loss during the period.
Using data on manufacturing industries, Acemoglu et al. (2014) In a much-publicized paper, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) estimate that the adoption of robots could have large, adverse effects on employment and wages in the future. However, because the adoption of industrial robots has been limited thus far, it can explain little of the sharp decline in employment that has occurred.
Recent studies also have found that the rise of markups since the 1980s and the offshoring of labor intensive processes (not capital investment) account for the rise of capital share (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2017; Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin 2013) . Such evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that a large technology shock caused employment declines and a concomitant rise in capital share in manufacturing.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MANUFACTURING JOB LOSSES
Among the most robust findings in labor economics is that plant closures and other mass layoffs have large, adverse, and lasting effects on workers and communities. 14 In a seminal article on workers laid off from distressed firms in Pennsylvania, Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) With just under 10 percent of U.S. employment located in the manufacturing sector, some may believe that manufacturing job losses matter little anymore. Yet through supply chain linkages, the manufacturing sector has an outsized effect on the economy. Approximately half of the labor needed in the production of manufactured goods in the United States and other advanced countries is employed outside the manufacturing sector. In addition to job creation effects through these input-output relationships, an increase in employment in the manufacturing sector increases local and national employment by increasing demand: the additional employed manufacturing workers spend more in the economy, creating new jobs. Using a local general equilibrium model, Moretti (2010) estimates that each additional manufacturing job in a city generates 1.6 nonmanufacturing jobs. Multiplier effects are higher for skilled jobs: an additional skilled manufacturing job in a city generates an estimated 2.5 jobs in local goods and services.
Reflecting manufacturing's large spillover effects, research finds that the sudden and large job losses in manufacturing in the 2000s are to a large degree responsible for the weak job growth and poor labor market outcomes among less-educated workers during that decade, although the housing boom in the early 2000s initially masked some of the effects of manufacturing job losses (Acemoglu et al. 2016; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo 2016 ).
An important lesson from the research literature is that the size of the adverse shock matters for workers' reemployment and earnings and for regional economic outcomes. Workers' long-term earnings losses depend to a large extent on the prevailing local labor market conditions at the time of the loss; those losing jobs in weak labor markets suffer larger earnings losses (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993) , and the effects of job loss are worse for workers during a recession (von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009). Correspondingly, the effects of trade and other adverse economic shocks on regional economies depend critically on the size of the shocks. While local economies can recover from modest setbacks relatively quickly, large adverse shocks can overwhelm a local economy, causing a downward spiral and depressing its economy for decades.
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CONCLUSION
Two stylized facts underlie the prevailing view that automation largely caused the relative decline and, in the 2000s, the large absolute decline in U.S. manufacturing employment: first, manufacturing real output growth has largely kept pace with that of the aggregate economy for decades, and second, manufacturing labor productivity growth has been considerably higher.
These statistics appear to provide a compelling case that domestic manufacturing is strong, and that, as in agriculture, productivity growth, assumed to reflect automation, is largely responsible for the relative and absolute decline in manufacturing employment. Although the size and scope of the decline in employment manufacturing industries in the 2000s was unprecedented, many see it as part of a long-term trend and deem the role of trade small.
That view, I have argued, reflects a misinterpretation of the numbers. First, aggregate manufacturing output and productivity statistics are dominated by the computer industry and mask considerable weakness in most manufacturing industries, where real output growth has been much slower than average private sector growth since the 1980s and has been anemic or declining since 2000. Second, labor productivity growth is not synonymous with, and is often a poor indicator of, automation. Measures of labor productivity growth may capture many forces besides automation-including improvements in product quality, outsourcing and offshoring, and a changing industry composition owing to international competition. Indeed, the rapid productivity growth in the computer and electronics products industry, and by extension in the manufacturing sector, largely reflects improvements in product quality, not automation. In short, the stylized facts, when properly interpreted, do not provide prima facie evidence that automation drove the relative and absolute decline in manufacturing employment.
It is difficult to parse out the effects of various factors on manufacturing employment, and research does not provide simple decompositions of the total contribution that trade and the broader forces of globalization make to manufacturing's recent employment decline.
Nevertheless, the research evidence points to trade and globalization as the major factor behind the large and swift decline of manufacturing employment in the 2000s. Although manufacturing processes continue to be automated, there is no evidence that the pace of automation in the sector accelerated in the 2000s; if anything, research comes to the opposite conclusion.
Manufacturing still matters, and its decline has serious economic consequences.
Reflecting the sector's deep supply chains, manufacturing's plight contributed to the weak 29 employment growth and poor labor market outcomes prevailing during much of the 2000s.
Research shows that such large-scale shocks have persistent adverse effects on affected communities and their residents, though these costs rarely are fully considered in policy making (Klein, Schuh, and Triest 2003) . In addition, because manufacturing accounts for a disproportionate share of R&D, the health of manufacturing industries has important implications for innovation in the economy. The widespread denial of domestic manufacturing's weakness and globalization's role in its employment collapse has inhibited much-needed, informed debate over trade policies. 
The table shows, for various periods, decompositions of the difference in the employment growth rate in the private and manufacturing sectors-with and omitting the computer industry-into the part due to the difference in their real GDP growth and the part due to the difference in their labor productivity growth. Calculations are based on Equation (1) in the text and use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
